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This paper presents a monetary model that links interbank markets
to capital accumulation and growth. The purpose of this paper is to
study how interbank markets aﬀect real economic activities, and to ﬁnd
the monetary policy implications. The model shows that, in a stationary
equilibrium, the economy with interbank markets attains higher capital
stock than the economy without the markets, because of precautionary
money savings. In addition, I ﬁnd that inﬂationary policy is more de-
sirable in the economy without well-functioning interbank markets.
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11 Introduction
A large body of empirical studies suggest that banking activities are strongly
correlated with real economic activities (see Levine (1997) for a review). In-
terbank markets provide one of the most important functions in the ﬁnancial
system. These allow the reallocation of liquidity between banks. Banks with
low liquidity can borrow liquidity from banks with high liquidity through the
markets, and can then meet their liquidity demand. Despite their apparent
importance, interbank markets have received relatively little attention in the
academic literature.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a monetary model with ﬁnancial
intermediaries to analyze the linkage between interbank markets and real eco-
nomic performance. Speciﬁcally, in order to understand how interbank markets
aﬀect real economic activities, I compare two economies under diﬀerent condi-
tions: with and without interbank markets. The economy consists of a number
of regions. The number of agents who need liquidity in each region ﬂuctuates
randomly, but the aggregate demand for liquidity is constant. This setup al-
lows for interregional transactions, as regions with liquidity surpluses provide
liquidity for regions with liquidity shortages. The provision of insurance can
be organized through interbank markets.
The analysis described here is based on the monetary model developed in
Champ, Smith and Williamson(1996) and in Smith(2002). I employ an over-
lapping generations model in which spatial separation and limited communi-
cation generate a transactions role for ﬁat money. At the end of each period, a
fraction of agents is relocated to a diﬀerent location. The only asset that they
can use is ﬁat money. This allows money to be held even when dominated in
2the rate of return. Limited communication implies that relocated agents can-
not transact using privately issued liabilities in the new location. Agents who
are not relocated are not constrained in their transactions by the limitations
on communication. They can pay for consumption goods when old with checks
or other credit instruments. The other asset is a neoclasssical technology. The
stochastic relocations act like shocks to agents’ liquidity preferences. Idiosyn-
cratic shocks to agents create a role for banks to provide insurance against
these shocks, as in Diamond and Dybvig(1983).
The main result of the paper is to show that well-functioning interbank mar-
kets reduce banks’ cash reserves and increase investments in capital. If banks
cannot access the markets, banks cannot diversify liquidity risks and must hold
more cash by themselves to meet liquidity demands. If banks can access the
markets, they can diversify their risks and reduce their cash reserves, and make
more investments in capital. In addition, I show numerically that inﬂation-
ary monetary policy is more desirable in an economy without well-functioning
interbank markets. Inﬂationary policy gives banks incentive to reduce cash
reserves, and encourages them to make more investments in capital.
Several other papers have studied the functioning of interbank markets.
Bhattacharya and Gale(1987) model the role of interbank markets clearly,
and show that interbank markets insure banks against idiosyncratic liquid-
ity. Aghion et al.(1999) and Allen and Gale(2000) analyze the phenomena by
which banking failures are disseminated via interbank markets. Holmstrom
and Tirole(1998) and Diamond and Rajan(2005) analyze the optimal liquidity
provision by a central bank when interbank markets are subject to aggregate
liquidity shocks and contagious failure. Allen and Gale(2009) consider incom-
3plete interbank markets that result in limited hedging opportunities for banks,
and they show that a central bank can implement constrained eﬃcient alloca-
tion by using open-market operations.
The main diﬀerence between all these studies and mine is that they use static
models and do not consider monetary factors explicitly. In practice, almost
all interbank tradings are monetary and intertemporal activities. This paper
develops a monetary model with interbank markets, and analyzes the likage
between the markets and the real economy. Moreover, I study the diﬀerence
in optimal money growth under diﬀerent interbank regimes.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the eco-
nomic environment and considers the behavior of banks and government, and
the nature of factor market transactions. Section 3 considers banks’ problems
with and without interbank markets. Section 4 discusses general equilibria,
and section 5 analyzes the comparative statics consequences of monetary pol-
icy. Section 6 considers dynamic issues, while section 7 investigates welfare
and optimal monetary policy issues. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is based on Champ, Smith and Williamson(1996) and Smith(2002).
2.1 The Environment
I consider an economy consisting of an inﬁnite sequence of two-period-lived
overlapping generations. Let t = 0,1,2,... be index time. The world is
divided into two spatially separated locations, and each location consists of a
4number of regions of unit mass. Each region is populated by a continuum of
agents of unit mass. The two locations are completely symmetric in terms of
all economic activity.
All young agents are identical ex ante. They are endowed with one unit of
labor when young, which they supply inelastically, and they retire when old.
Young agents have no other endowments of goods or assets at any date.
All agents care only about second period consumption. Let ct denote the
second-period consumption of a representative agent born at t. Agents have
the same lifetime utility, u(c) = ln(c).
The consumption good is produced by a representative ﬁrm, which rents cap-
ital and hires labor from young agents. A representative ﬁrm uses a constant
returns to scale technology F(K,L), where K and L denote capital and labor
inputs, respectively. Let f(k) ≡ F(k,1) be the intensive production function,
where k = K/L is the capital-labor ratio. It is assumed that f0(k) > 0 > f00(k)
∀k, that f(0) = 0 holds, and that f satisﬁes the usual Inada conditions. For
simplicity, I assume that capital depreciates completely in the production pro-
cess.
As in Townsend(1987), I introduce a transaction role for money by empha-
sizing the spatial separation and the limited communication between the two
locations. Limited communication prevents privately issued liabilities from
being veriﬁable in the other location. Money is universally recognizable and
noncounterfeitable, and is therefore accepted in both locations. In particular,
at each date, agents can trade and communicate only with other agents in the
same location.
The timing of events within a period is as follows. First, ﬁrms rent capital
5and labor, produce the ﬁnal good, and pay their factors of production. Final
goods are then either consumed or are invested to create next period’s capital
stock. Young agents in each region receive wage income and deposit it with
a competitive bank. Banks use all deposits for capital investments and the
purchase of money balances from the old.
After deposits have been allocated between capital investments and cash
balances, a fraction πt of young agents in each region is relocated to the other
location. These agents are called “movers.” The value πt is diﬀerent across
regions. Relocation plays the role of a “liquidity preference shock” in the
Diamond and Dybvig(1983) model, and it is natural to asume that banks
arise to insure agents against these shocks. The relocation probability πt is
a random variable in each period. Because there is a continuum of young
agents, it represents the fraction of all movers in each region. That is, πt
gives the size of the aggregate liquidity in a region, and higher realizations of
πt correspond to higher demand for money. This is publicly observable and
is independent across regions, and identically distributed over time. Let G
represent the distribution function, which is assumed to be smooth and strictly
increasing on [0,1], and g the associated density function. The distribution G




To illustrate the role of interbank markets, I consider an economy where
an intermediary is allowed to operate in only one region. Legal restrictions
of this form were common in the United States and Japan in the past. Even
in the present day, there are still many banks in both countries that operate
only within a small region because of their size. As usual, I assume that there
6is free entry and that competition forces banks to maximize their depositors’
expected utility.
2.2 Factor Markets
The exchange of capital and labor occurs autarkically within each location.
Markets in capital and labor are competitive, implying that all factors are paid
their marginal product. Let Rt denote the time t rental rate for capital, and
wt denote the time t real wage rate. Then,
Rt = f
0(kt) ∀t ≥ 0, (1)
wt = f(kt) − ktf
0(kt) ≡ w(kt) ∀t ≥ 0. (2)
Note that w0(k) > 0 for all k.
Let the function Ω be deﬁned as Ω(k) ≡ k/w(k). For the present, it is
assumed that
Ω
0(k) > 0 (3)
holds for all k. For instance, inequality (3) holds if f is any CES production
function with elasticity of substitution no less than one.
2.3 Government
The government can change the money stock by making lump-sum transfers
to young agents. Let Mt denote the per capita quantity of ﬁat money in each
location at date t. Money stock grows at a constant gross rate σ, so that
Mt+1 = σMt. If I let τt denote the transfer received by a young agent at date








holds for all t, where mt is the real money balance per young person at the
end of date t.
2.4 Banks’ behavior
As in Diamond and Dybvig(1983), the savings of all young agents will be
intermediated. Banks in each region take deposits from young agents in the
same region and choose how much to invest in capital it and money balances
mt. Let pt denote the time t price level. The rate of return on real balances
between t and t+1 is pt/pt+1. Banks promise a return of dm(π) to each mover,
and dt(π) to each non-mover per unit on their deposits. These returns depend
on π. It is assumed that there is free entry into banking and that banks are
competitive, in the sense that they take the real return on assets as given.
Thus, intermediaries in each region are Nash competitors on the deposit side.
That is, banks announce deposit return schedules (dm
t (π), dt(π)), taking the
announced return schedules of other banks as given.
Let αt(π) denote the fraction of cash reserves that the bank pays out at
t, and let bt(π) be the real balances that a bank borrows from or lends to
interbank markets at the end of t. If bt(π) is positive, a bank borrows cash
from banks in other region; while, if it is negative, a bank lends cash to them
through the interbank markets. If the interbank markets are perfect, banks
can use these markets to borrow or lend cash freely at the market rate. Let φt
denote the gross nominal interest rate of the interbank market at date t.
8After banks create their portfolio and learn the liquidity shocks of their
region, the interbank markets open, and they decide whether to borrow or
to lend cash at φt. If, at the end of date t, a bank in a region with high
liquidity shock demands cash bt(π), it can borrow ptbt(π) yen from other banks
in regions with a low liquidity shock through the interbank markets. On the
following date, the bank must pay back φt+1bt(π)pt yen to these banks. Let
rb
t+1 ≡ φt+1pt/pt+1 denote the gross real interest rate of the interbank markets.
I use this rate in the following discussions instead of φt+1.
The bank faces the following constraints on its choices it, mt, dm
t (π), and
dt(π). First, the bank’s balance sheet requires that
it + mt ≤ wt + τt ∀t. (5)
Second, payments to movers at t, πdm
t (π)(wt+τt), cannot exceed the date t+1
value of the bank’s holding, and the borrowing of cash reserves. Then,
πd
m







must hold. Finally, real payments to non-movers cannot exceed the value of
the bank’s remaining reserves plus the income from capital investments minus
the repayments of the interbank loan, so that
(1 − π)dt(π)(wt + τt) ≤ [1 − αt(π)]mt
pt
pt+1
+ Rt+1it − bt(π)r
b
t+1, ∀t. (7)
Of course, 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 and mt ≥ 0 must hold.
Because banks behave as Nash competitors and there is free entry, banks in







t (π)(wt + τt)] + (1 − π)ln[dt(π)(wt + τt)]
}
g(π)dπ (8)
9subject to the constraints just described.
Let γt ≡ mt/(wt +τt) denote the bank’s reserve-deposit ratio at date t, and
let δt(π) ≡ bt(π)/(wt + τt) denote the real value of the bank’s borrowing or
lending from the interbank markets per unit of deposits at date t.
3 An economy with and without interbank mar-
kets
3.1 An economy without interbank markets
In this section, I consider an economy in which any bank in any region
cannot access other banks in other regions. That is, there are no interbank
markets, and the regions are ﬁnancial autarkies. Thus, all banks have to set
bt(π) = 0, or equivalently δt(π) = 0, and they meet the liquidity demands of
their depositors by using their own cash reserves. This environment is quite
similar to Champ, Smith and Williamson(1996) and Smith(2002).
The function αt, which is the fraction of bank reserves paid out to movers,
is chosen after the realization of π, while the function γt, which is the fraction
of reserves in the asset portfolio of the banks, is chosen before the realization
of π. Hence, I solve the problem backwards, by ﬁrst ﬁnding the optimal values



























γt It) if 0 < π < π¤
1 if π¤ ≤ π < 1
(10)
10where It = Rt+1
pt+1




γt + (1 − γt)It
.
For realizations of the liquidity shock below the critical value π¤, the bank
pays out only a fraction of its reserves to movers. However, when the realization
of the liquidity shock is greater than π¤, all reserves are paid out to movers,
and repayments to non-movers are drawn from capital investments only. In
this paper, I refer to this event as a “liquidity crisis” in the sense that there
are so many movers that, even if all the bank’s reserves are given to them,
they will receive a lower return than the non-movers.
I now proceed to solve for the optimal value of γt. By substituting the
































The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem can be reduced to




This implicitly deﬁnes the solution to the bank’s problem when the interbank
market is unable to function are provided. If It = 1, equation (12) is satisﬁed
only by γt = 1. If It > 1 holds, then equation (12) has two solutions. How-
ever, it is easy to show that the interior solution γ(It) solves the optimization
problem, and that γt = 1 is not optimal when It > 1. For future reference, I
note the following properties of γ(It).
11Lemma 1
(i) γ(1) = 1 (13)
(ii) lim
It!1
γ(It) = E(π) (14)
(iii) γ
0(It) < 0 for all It. (15)
Note that inequality γ(It) > E(π) holds for all It.
3.2 An economy with interbank markets
Next I analyze an economy in which interbank markets open and create a
balance between the supply and demand of banks’ cash reserves. The essential
purpose of the markets is to allow banks with high liquidity needs to borrow
cash from banks with low liquidity. After the realization of π, a bank deter-
mines the real amount b that it would like to borrow(lend). On the following
date, the bank returns (obtains) rbb, where rb is the real interest rate of the
market.
Both the fraction of bank reserves paid out to movers αt, and the real value
of the liquidity needs δt, are chosen after the realization of π, while ˆ γt, the
reserve deposit ratio of a bank in the economy with a perfect interbank market,
is chosen before the realization of π. Hence, as in the previous section, I ﬁrst
solve for the optimal values of αt and δt, as functions of ˆ γt and π. That is, I















+ (1 − π)ln
[













12The solution to this problem sets
αt(π) = 1, (17)




(1 − ˆ γt). (18)
Equation (17) says that it is optimal for banks not to pay cash reserves to
non-movers at all, without depending on the realizations of π. When demand
for liquidity is fairly low, i.e., equation (18) is negative, the bank is able to
meet the demand by using its own cash reserves, and it is optimal to lend
the remaining reserves to other banks with high liquidity shocks, through the
interbank market. On the other hand, when demand for liquidity is high
enough, i.e., when equation (18) is positive, the bank pays out all its reserves
to movers and, in addition, borrows cash from other banks with low liquidity
shocks, through the interbank markets.
Next, I determine the optimal value of ˆ γt. To do so, I substitute the optimal
values of αt and δt into the bank’s objective function, so that the only remaining
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0 if Rt+1 > rb
t+1
∈ [0,1] if Rt+1 = rb
t+1
1 if Rt+1 < rb
t+1.
(20)
If Rt+1 > rb
t+1, banks will be willing to invest all their deposits in capital, and
to meet the liquidity demand of depositors by using cash borrowed from other
banks through the interbank market. In this case, no one holds cash, and,
13consequently, the real value of money is zero. If Rt+1 < rb
t+1, banks will be
willing to hold their all deposit in cash, and to lend their remaining reserves to
other banks through the interbank market. In this case, capital investments
do not occur, and outputs and wage income will be zero. In an equilibrium, it
is necessary that the no-arbitrage condition, Rt+1 = rb
t+1, holds.
4 General Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is characterized by the market clearing con-
ditions for real balances, capital, the interbank market, and the government
budget constraint. Because the supply of real balances is equal to mt = Mt/pt
and the demand for real balances is given γ(It)(wt + τt), market clearing for
real balances is
mt = γ(It)(wt + τt). (21)
Next, the time t + 1 capital stock must equal the level of investments at t.
From the bank’s balance sheet constraint (5), this requires that
kt+1 = it = [1 − γ(It)](wt + τt). (22)
Therefore, the government budget constraint (4) must hold. By using the
government budget constraint τt = σ¡1
σ mt in equation (21), we have





By substituting this equation into (21) and (22), the expressions for mt and











Finally, the interbank market clearing condition is
∫ 1
0
δt(π)g(π)dπ = 0. (26)
These three conditions, together with the given initial values of k0 and M0,
describe the equilibrium path of the economy for a ﬁxed money growth rate σ.
4.1 Equilibrium without interbank markets
We ﬁrst start by deriving the equilibrium in which the interbank markets
are non-operating. In this case, the optimal reserve-deposit ratio is γ(It) which
satisﬁes equation (12). By substituting equation (24) into the identity It =
Rt+1pt+1/pt = Rt+1σmt/mt+1, we can obtain the dynamic system that deﬁnes














In order to study the steady state equilibrium without the interbank market,
I impose kt+1 = kt = k and It+1 = It = I in equations (27) and (28). It is









154.2 Equilibrium with interbank markets
Next, I proceed to describe the equilibrium in which the interbank market is
fully functioning. In this case, the optimal reserve-deposit ratio is ˆ γ(It), which




must hold for all t. In equilibrium, we cannot have γt = 0, since movers would
then have zero consumption. In addition, we cannot have γt = 1 either, since
there is then too much liquidity in the interbank markets, and R < rb will
no longer hold. By using this condition and the interbank market clearing
condition (26), we obtain
ˆ γt = E(π). (32)
Figure 1 illustrates the determination of the reserve-deposit ratio and the
real interest rate of the interbank markets in equilibrium. It is easy to show
that δ(π) = π − E(π). This solution means that a bank in each region will
hold money, i.e., a share of deposits equal to the share of movers in the regions
as a whole, E(π). For the liquidity shock of a region below the value E(π),
the bank will borrow cash from other banks at rb
t and pay out all its reserves,
plus the liquidity it obtains from the loan, to movers in the region. When
the liquidity shock is larger than E(π), the bank will pay out only a fraction
of its reserves to movers, and lend the remainder to other banks through the
interbank markets.1
Now, we have the following lemma.
1Under logarithmic utility, the optimal reserve-deposit ratio does not depend on the
opportunity cost of holding reserves It.
16Lemma 2 For all σ, we have
ˆ γt < γt. (33)
Proof of the lemma is straightforward from Lemma 1. Lemma 2 states that
the cash reserves of banks that are able to access to the interbank markets
are less than the reserves of banks that are unable to access these markets. In
other words, banks in an economy with interbank markets make more capital
investments than banks in an economy without such markets. Interbank mar-
kets play an important role in risk sharing between banks. If the interbank
markets are unable to function, banks have to hold precautionary cash reserves
against liquidity shocks. Figure 2 illustrates the reserve-deposit ratios of the
two types of economies, as a function of the nominal interest rate.
By substituting equation (32) into equations (25) and (27), we can obtain









The dynamic properties of equation (34) are the same as the properties of
the standard Diamond(1965) model. Then the steady state values I and k








17Figure 3 depicts the determination of the steady state equilibria. Clearly,
there is a unique steady state equilibrium in both banking economies. E1(E2) is
the steady state equilibrium without(with) interbank markets. It is easy to see
that the economy with interbank markets attains higher capital accumulation
than the economy without interbank markets, i.e., ˆ k¤ > k¤ for a given money
growth rate, σ. As a result, interbank risk sharing leads to high outputs.
5 Comparative Statics
An increase in the money growth rate shifts the locus deﬁned by equation
(27) upwards and that deﬁned by equations (28) and (32) to the right, in Figure
4. As a result, an increase in the rate of money creation leads to a higher steady
state nominal rate of interest and capital stock in both economies. That is,
the Tobin eﬀect prevails in both economies. The main reason for the presence
of the eﬀect is that any seigniorage collected is rebated to the young, which
increases deposits, and also imcreases the investment in capital. In addition to
the wealth eﬀect of inﬂation, there is the portfolio eﬀect in an economy without
interbank markets. In this economy, inﬂation raises the cost of holding money
and increases investments, since the reserve-deposit ratio is decreasing in the
nominal interest rate. In an economy with interbank markets, however, money
demand is interest-invariant for the case of logarithmic utility. More generally,
money demand will respond to the interest rate, and there exists the portfolio
eﬀect in an economy with markets.
186 Dynamics
In this section, I investigate dynamical equilibria. To simplify the discussion,
I consider only the situation of Cobb-Douglas production, f(k) = Akα, with
α ∈ (0,1). First, I begin by studying the dynamic equilibrium with interbank
markets. From equation (35), we can obtain the law of motion for the per
capita capital stock, which is given by
kt+1 =








σ E(π) . For a given value of σ, ψ is a positive constant.
Hence the dynamic properties of equation (37) are the same as the properties
of the standard Diamond(1965) model. Clearly, the dynamic equation has a
unique positive steady state, ˆ k¤ = ψ
1
1−α, and the steady state is globally stable.
Next, we consider the dynamic equilibrium without interbank markets. With
the Cobb-Douglas production, the dynamic system consisting of equations (27)







(1 − α)[1 − γ(It)]γ(It+1)
, (38)
kt+1 =





It will be useful to analyze the local dynamics in the neighborhood of the
steady state. I linearize equations (38) and (39) in the neighborhood of the





















19Let D and T denote the determinant and the trace, respectively, of J.




γ(I)[1 − γ(I)] − Iγ0(I)
γ0(I)
> 0, (40)
T = α −
1 − α
ασ
γ(I)[1 − γ(I)] − Iγ0(I)
γ0(I)
> 0. (41)
Since D and T are both positive, it is clear that D > −T−1 holds. In addition,
from (40) and (41), we have T = α + D
α. Thus, D < T − 1 iﬀ D > α. This
inequality holds for any I if α is suﬃciently small. This implies that the steady
state equilibrium without interbank markets is a saddle. Since the eigenvalues
of J are positive, the paths approaching the steady state equilibrium display
monotonic increases or decreases in kt and It.
7 Welfare and Optimal Monetary Policy
We now compare welfare with or without the interbank market. Let W
denote the steady-state expected utility of a representative depositor. We







t (π)(wt + τt)] + (1 − π)ln[dt(π)(wt + τt)]
}
g(π)dπ, (42)
so that W is the government’s objective function.
Using the steady-state equilibrium conditions, we can rewrite indirect utility




















































In this section, I assume that f(k) = Akα, with α ∈ (0,1). From this
assumption, we can obtain the optimal monetary policy analytically in the
economy with interbank markets as follows.




(1 − α)[1 − E(π)]
.
To characterize the solutions to equation (12), I make the additional assump-
tion that π is uniformly distributed, so that g(π) = 1 holds for all π ∈ [0,1].
Since it is not possible to pursue the welfare function without interbank
markets analytically, I will resort to numerical analysis. Figure 5 presents
the welfare of both as a function of the rate of money growth.2 The solid
line represents welfare where interbank markets are functioning well, while the
dashed line represents welfare without interbank markets.
From Figure 5, the following ﬁndings are obtained. First, welfare with inter-
bank markets is higher than welfare without interbank markets, for any σ > 0.
The intuition is simple. Banks that cannot undertake bank-to-bank transac-
tions are forced to hold precautionary cash holdings. This type of cash holding
is an unproductive activity. When the interbank markets are functioning well,
2I set α = 0.35 and A = 5. Because I assume that money is dominated in the rate
of return, ˆ σ¤ must satisfy f0(ˆ k¤ |σ=ˆ σ∗) ≥ 1
ˆ σ∗. This condition is reduced to E(π) ≥ 1¡2α
1¡α .
α = 0.35 and E(π) = 1
2 satisfy this condition.
21however, this type of cash holdings will turn into investments in capital, and
the consumption of non-movers will increase.
Next, optimal money growth diﬀers between the two economies. To be more
precise, inﬂationary policy is more desirable in the economy with interbank
markets than in the economy without them. In fact, numerical calculations
show that the optimal money growth with the markets is ˆ σ¤ ≈ 1.07, while
the optimal money growth without the markets is σ¤ ≈ 1.43. Banks in the
economy without markets tend to have more cash reserves than the liquidity
demand of the overall economy. The extra cash reserves are unproductive,
and inﬂationary policy reduces these reserves. As a result, the consumption of
non-movers increases, and welfare improves.
8 Conclusion
This paper has developed a monetary model of interbank markets. I show
that interbank markets have a function that allows banks to diversify their
liquidity risks, and, as a result, this reduces banks’ cash reserves and increases
investments in capital. In sum, the markets can aﬀect real economic activities
and lead to higher income per capita. The results obtained here are consistent
with the empirical observations that countries with developed ﬁnancial systems
are wealthy. In addition, I demonstrate that, if an economy does not have well-
functioning interbank markets, then an inﬂationary policy will be desirable.
An inﬂationary policy gives banks incentive to reduce cash reserves, and en-
courages them to make more investments in capital. The results suggests that
the optimal monetary policy depends on the level of ﬁnancial development. In
this paper, I assume logarithmic utility for reasons of analytical convenience.
22It would be interesting to see how the results obtained here change under the
more general CRRA utility form. I leave this question for future research.
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Figure 4. An increase in the rate of money growth









Welfare with and without interbank markets








Welfare without interbank markets
Welfare with interbank markets
Figure 5. Welfare with and without interbank markets.
27